The research reported in this paper was undertaken to obtain a better understanding of problem solving and scientific reasoning in 10-year-old children. The study involved measuring children's competence at syllogistic reasoning and in solving a series of problems requiring inductive reasoning. Children were also categorized on the basis of levels of simultaneous and successive synthesis. Simultaneous and successive synthesis represent two dimensions of information processing identified by Luria in a program of neuro-psychological research. Simultaneous synthesis involves integration of information in a holistic or spatial fashion whereas successive synthesis involves processing information sequentially with temporal links between stimuli. Analysis of the data generated in the study indicated that syllogistic reasoning and inductive reasoning were significantly correlated with both simultaneous and successive synthesis. However, the strongest correlation was found between simultaneous synthesis and inductive reasoning. These findings provide a basis for understanding the roles of spatial and verbal-logical ability as defined by Luria's neuropsychological theory in scientific problem solving. The results also highlight the need for teachers to provide experiences which are compatible with individual students' information processing styles.
The purpose of this paper is to report on a study of individual differences in reasoning skills of 10-year-old children. In particular, the research has drawn upon the Luria model of information processing (1973) and examines children's achievement in two tasks which purport to underlie formal scientific reasoning. The work seen in conjunction with that of Clement (1994) provides clues to the use of imagery in scientific problem solving expertise.
The teaching of science is often justified on the grounds that children need to develop the logical and critical thinking that epitomizes science (Harlen, 1985) . The vast literature on misconceptions and alternative frameworks indicates that children's knowledge is frequently inconsistent with the "scientifically correct" version. Modern constructivist theories imply that conceptual understanding in individual children is a personal goal achieved through active involvement and problem solving in contexts relevant to the child (Yager, 1991) . Thus, if students can be given opportunities to think logically, reflect on experiences and justify their reasoning then more effective learning may occur (Swartz & Perkins, 1989) . The successful implementation of a thinking-based science program is predicated on a knowledge of the individuality of children's reasoning processes given that individuals process information differently from each other (Siegler, 1988) .
In the preamble to this paper we highlight the notion that individual differences need to be considered in order to understand how children learn science. One area of individual differences that has been explored over the years is the role of spatial ability in learning. Several studies have shown that students with high ability in solving spatial problems achieve well in science and mathematics (Siemonkowski & MacKnight, 1971) . Baker and Talley (1972, 1974) postulated that spatial visualization was a mediator in problem solving in chemistry, in so far as the manipulation of three dimensional objects facilitated the development of imagery analogs that assisted in the understanding of concepts. Others have shown that students with high spatial ability have tended to perform better also in chemistry, especially in tasks requiring problem solving and mental manipulation of two dimensional objects or symbolic representations (Carter, Larussa & Bodner, 1987; Pribyl & Bodner, 1987) . Small and Morton (1983) found evidence that organic chemistry students could benefit from a spatial visualization training program. A study by Pallrand and Seeber (1984) showed that spatial abilities affected a student's decision to study college physics and that these abilities improved in those students who did study physics. Lord (1987) demonstrated that spatial ability is an advantage in biology laboratory activities. Spatial skills would also be crucial in the interpretations of diagrams and illustrations which are essential in effective scientific communication (Hill, 1988; Symington, 1984) . In the domain of mathematics many have argued that mathematical reasoning is facilitated by the ability of the reasoner to interrelate spatial images and verbal propositions (Battista, 1994; Bishop, 1989; Hermelin & O'Connor,1986; Krutetskii, 1976) .
Spatial ability, however, is a nebulous construct mostly identified in psychometric research as an outcome of a factor analysis of a battery of tasks and not deduced from an established theory (Eliot, 1987; Lohman, Pellegrino, Alderton & Regian, 1987) . Insights into spatial ability and the individual characteristics that lead to the expression of spatial ability can be gleaned from the neurophysiological theory attributed to Luria (1973) . Luria's model of information processing Luria described three principal functional units or blocks, defined by the role they assume in overall cognitive processing, as elements of cognitive function. The first unit is described as an arousal and attention unit, the second unit functions to gather, process and store information and the third unit involves programming, regulation and verification of information. Luria argued that the second functional orchestrates the conversion of concrete experiences into abstract thinking. Luria hypothesized that both verbal and nonverbal information can be processed either simultaneously or successively. In simultaneous synthesis each piece of information is immediately accessible in relation to another. Successive synthesis involves the processing of information in a time dependent sequential mode. Luria's original model has provided a framework for the development of a model of information processing by Das and Varnhargen (1986) . In Das's model information is synthesized into simultaneous, quasi-spatial format or a temporally organized format irrespective of the mode of information presentation to the sensory receptor. The way information is processed depends on the individual, their level of attention, the nature of the task, and interactions between these variables. In so far as spatial ability is concerned, tasks traditionally associated with high spatial ability are facile for those individuals who process information through structures involving simultaneous processes.
Support for the Luria model of information processing comes mostly from the laboratory of Das and colleagues at Alberta and consequently one operationalisation of the model has been referred to as the Luria-Das model (Das, 1972; Das, Kirby, & Jarman, 1975 , 1979 Das & Molloy, 1975; Das & Varnhagen, 1986; Kirby & Das, 1976 , 1978 Naglieri & Das, 1990; Naglieri, Das & Jarman, 1990) . Other support for the general model developed by Luria comes from the work of Green (1977) , Ransley (1981 ), Walton, (1983 , Angus (1984) , Crawford (1986) and Woodley (1993) . Studies of children's writing skills have also reinforced the applicability of the Luria model. For example, Harris and Wachs (1986) have found that children high in successive processing produce fewer sentence errors whereas those high in simultaneous processing appeared to form better links between sentences and paragraphs. Performance on other tasks such as conservation, transitive inference and class inclusion is better in children who exhibit simultaneous rather than successive processing (Das & Verhargen, 1986) . Wachs and Harris (1986) have also shown that levels of simultaneous processing are high among university students who are successful in mathematics. Thus, Luria's model provides a framework for examining processes involved in scientific reasoning.
Inductive and deductive reasoning
In the context of this study formal reasoning is restricted to intellectual activity with problems whose solutions are governed by a system of logic (Galotti, 1989) . Two modes of formal reasoning extensively studied include inductive and deductive tasks both of which contribute to scientific processes (Chalmers, 1982) . Through the inductive process of reasoning, understanding is derived from consideration of observable characteristics. One is able to generalize from facts acquired through observation.
Deductive reasoning is a broad term covering the encoding and combination of statements using logical connectives, transitive inference or syllogistic reasoning and propositional reasoning. Deductive reasoning involves the process of logically deriving facts, outcomes or consequences, from ideas or theories based on the formal truth relationships between premises without regard for the empirical or practical truth value of the premises. Effective reasoning requires the ability to develop arguments and assess their validity to generate and test hypotheses, to judge the plausibility of assertions, to identify possible courses of action, and to think through the consequences of choosing a particular course (Nickerson, 1986) . Mayer and Revlin (1978) argued that traditional syllogisms are a valid means of probing rational thought processes because they provide a standardized format for analyzing decision-making. Nevertheless, the role of pure logic in scientific reasoning, as defined by competence in traditional syllogisms, has been brought into question (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver, 1986; O'Brien, 1987) . However, from an historical and philosophical perspective, syllogistic reasoning is an important component of scientific reasoning and remains a field of active research (Adams, 1984; Galotti & Komatsu, 1989) . De Soto, London and Handel (1965) obtained evidence that adults solve linear syllogisms involving ordering relationships by constructing spatial images to represent order in the premises. In a comprehensive model of syllogistic reasoning, Guyote and Sternberg (1981) At a more general level, Goldman (1986) identified two main competing theories in defining the role of cognition in deductive reasoning: the mental logic theory and the mental models theory. The mental logic theory assumes that individuals possess schemata for holding and implementing sets of rules that carry out mental derivations. The main support for this theory comes from Rips (1983) through computer simulations. JohnsonLaird's (1983) implementation of the mental models theory argues that people interpret premises as representations constructed from "tokens" arranged in a particular structure rather than verbal associations. Subjects make associations and construct imagistic representations based on developing or identifying analogies between the elements of the premise (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) . Markovits (1993) has attempted to reconcile Piagetian theories on the development of possibility and necessity in conditional reasoning with the mental-models-information-processing theory by arguing that the generality of logical reasoning varies with the degree of abstraction of the corresponding mental model. The development of inductive reasoning has been intensively researched as it pertains to scientific reasoning. diSessa, (1983, 1993) has argued that scientific explanation begins with the act of observation. Initially, every act of seeing isolated or discrete phenomena leads to consideration, reflection and combination. These observations are sorted with the viewer seeking more general abstractions and theories. However, even the highest level is phenomenological. diSessa (1983) argues that scientific understanding is predicated by phenomenological primitives which serve as elements of analysis or models, that partly explain and provide link between the memory of an event and understanding of more complex or formal ideas. These primitives, which also appear to be mental representations of events or entities, provide the basis for analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning, however, is an inductive process in which the thinker transfers or generalizes from the stored model representation to explain other phenomena (DeJong, 1989; D. Gentner & D. R. Gentner, 1983; Gentner, 1989; Halford, 1992) . The construction of an analogy can demand a high information processing load. Halford (1992) has shown that processes involving transitive inference and class inclusion require a higher processing load than young children can generally cope with.
The relationship between inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning and analogical reasoning has been described by Michalski (1989) . The process of recognizing the existence of an analogy between stored knowledge and an event is intrinsically inductive; whereas according to Michalski, the process of deriving inferences about the analogue using analogical mapping is deductive. That is, the construction of the analogy which unifies the base and target systems is an inductive process but the use of the analogy is a deductive exercise.
The bimodality of cognitive processing was also evident in the results of Galotti and Kamatsu's study (1989) . They explained the observed differences in solution strategies between 12 year-old children and children of 14 years and older as due to age-dependent differences in preferred strategies. Most models of deductive reasoning involve either a spatial or analytical process. For example, the reasoner may generate a representation of the premises which is isomorphic to Euler diagrams (Erickson, 1978) or similar spatial constructions (DeSoto et al. 1965; Guyote & Sternberg, 1981) . Alternatively, an algorithmic or rule based model may be preferred by others (Braine & Rumain, 1983; Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Tabossi, 1989; Rips, 1983) . Sternberg (1980) observed the coexistence of both processes and postulated a mixed model involving spatial and analytical components.
Summary
This review has focussed on two dimensions of teaching science namely, the individuality of the learner and the nature or demands of the task confronting the learner. We have attempted to argue that information is processed simultaneously (spatially) and/or successively (involving rules) and that scientific reasoning involves both inductive and deductive reasoning. Our proposition is that individuals adopt strategies in solving problems that utilize their particular strengths or modes of information processing. The significance of this study is that we provide evidence for individual differences in children's strategies for solving reasoning tasks based on a model of cognition derived from brain research. Our research provides a base for developing and implementing a curriculum that takes into account individual differences. Catering for individual differences needs to involve the provision of multi-modal experiences including, for example the use of diagrams (Larkin & Simon, 1987; Lowe, 1986; Mayer & Gallini, 1990 ), heuristics (de Bono, 1976 , or collaborative grouping through which individuals can construct their own unique representations of knowledge (Slavin, 1991) . The study also provides the basis for further research on the question whether a particular mode of information processing is an advantage in scientific reasoning and the extent to which the teaching of science fails to exploit these more appropriate modes.
Specifically, the aim of the present study was to investigate children's reasoning abilities in solving problems of induction and deduction. The relationship between these abilities and children's modes of information processing or cognitive style, as defined by the Luria model, was explored by examining the correlation between children's performance on these problems and factor scores indicative of levels of simultaneous and successive processing.
Methodology Subjects
One hundred and eighty two students (age: M = 10.2, SD = 0.6) from 14 elementary public schools in the metropolitan area of Brisbane, Australia, participated in this study. The subjects were predominantly middle class and were randomly selected from a total population of over six hundred children. All the children were from homes where English was the first language. There were approximately equal numbers of males and females in the population. Not all subjects were able to complete every test due to absences and time constraints.
Instruments and procedures
Subjects were administered a test battery that measures simultaneous and successive processing and selective attention. The tests were developed by Fitzgerald (1971) and subsequently used by his students, Green (1977) , Angus (1984) and Crawford (1986) , Woodley (1993) and others (Hunt & Randhawa, 1983 (Raven, Court & Raven, 1986) , which was shown by Das (1972) to load factorially mostly on simultaneous processing in normal Canadian children, completed the battery.
Administration and scoring were as follows. The letter span, word span and number span tests comprized 15 lists of randomly arranged lists of letters, words and numbers. No element was repeated in each list and the length varied from three to seven elements. List size was also randomly arranged. The elements of each list were dictated with a pause of one second between each. The subjects were required to memorize each list and to write the list in the presented sequence on an answer sheet. Credit for each response was given where the subject reported elements in the correct sequence and not for the absolute number recalled. The matrix tests involved students memorizing a pattern arranged within a nine dot matrix and presented on a large cardboard poster held by the researcher at the front of the group. Subjects were given eight seconds to view the pattern and then requested to draw the pattern from memory within a blank dot matrix on an answer sheet. In Matrix B, the subjects were required to rotate mentally the image through 180 degrees and present that rotated image as their answer.
The tests to establish the simultaneous and successive factor scores were group administered in two sessions on different days. Groups comprising a maximum of fifteen children were tested in two sessions of no longer than forty minutes on each alternate day. The Raven's CPM was administered individually to children in a separate room. The order of administration of tests was counterbalanced.
Subjects were also presented with two tasks which measure reasoning. Both of these tasks were structured to be content free with no relationship to previous practical knowledge. Deductive reasoning ability was assessed with a set of 10 syllogisms (Appendix 1). Five of these syllogisms involved premises based on fantasy or makebelieve animals called Bongos and Wobbles whereas the other five syllogisms contained premises which involved real entities. When presented with the fantasy syllogisms, the subjects were encouraged to believe that they were visitors to a distant planet inhabited by these creatures that behaved in strange ways. Both sets of syllogisms were constructed with premises which were contrary to real-life experience or counterfactual and all were positive, universal syllogisms. The order of presentation was counterbalanced so that approximately half of the subjects received the make-believe syllogisms first. The syllogisms were also presented verbally to individual children in the same session as Raven's CPM.
A "yes" or "no" response to a syllogism was followed up with a probing question, "Why". If children gave vague justifications such as, "Because it is a Bongo", the researcher probed further with questions like, "and what do you know about Bongos?". Explanations were recorded by video tape and examined by the researcher and a research assistant. A response which indicated that the child was able to justify the correct answer on the basis of information given in the premise was considered to represent an example of logical deductive reasoning and was awarded one point. Alternative answers which repeated the syllogism or where the child persistently said, "Because it is a Bongo" were coded as non-logical and scored zero points. Consequently, two scales for deductive reasoning were constructed with one measuring reasoning involving fantasy-based premises and the other with real-life premises. The researcher and research assistant independently coded the responses. For most responses, intercoder agreement was high (98%). Agreement was reached on the remaining cases after discussion.
The second reasoning task involved a 15 item test based on the ESS Creature Cards Activity (Elementary Science Study, 1974) . The subjects were required to undertake an identification and an application task as part of this activity. The creature card activity, as originally used in the ESS program, involved presenting to the subject a set of between five and seven drawings which were described as all being some imaginary creature such as a florgiedorfle. A further set of drawings was presented with a label indicating that none of those particular drawings was a florgiedorfle. Finally, a third set of drawings was presented with a label requesting the subject to identify which of this set of drawings was a florgiedorfle.
In our study, each subject received a booklet containing, on a separate page, the set of drawings representing each imaginary creature and the set of drawings representing nonexamples. The items were graded in difficulty according to the number of attributes (which ranged from one to three) needed to define membership. A booklet of answer sheets was provided in which the third set of mixed creatures and non-creatures was drawn. The subjects were required to circle letters representing the correct responses and were awarded one point for every correct choice and were deducted one point for every incorrectly identified case. No penalty was given for failing to identify an example. A total score of 45 on the inductive logic scale was possible. As an addition to the activity, children were required to apply their understanding of the task by drawing a creature in the answer booklet consistent with the label that described the example. They were instructed not to copy directly any of the given examples. One point was awarded only if the child's drawing of a creature contained all the attributes that were necessary to define membership of that particular group of fictitious creatures (CREATURE design variable). The Creature Card Activity was administered at the same time as the group tests but after initial verbal instructions and a worked sample problem, the children were allowed to progress at their own pace with no time limit set for completion of the task. Lawson et al. (1991) used some of these problems in a study of the relationship between hypothetico-deductive reasoning and concept acquisition in high school students. In their study they argued that successful identification of class membership of a particular imaginary creature depended upon a sequence of reasoning best described as hypotheticaldeductive. However, they did acknowledge the more parsimonious possibility that success on the test could be due to an inductive reasoning process in which the subject "generates an idea" or representation of a creature and then seeks to match the examples of possible creatures with the representation. We are more comfortable with this latter interpretation of the task for 10-year old children and consequently have used the task as a probe of inductive reasoning.
The two tasks used to probe reasoning have several features that need to be emphasized. Firstly, both the syllogisms and the ESS Creature Cards are problems in which the subject should find personal experience a hindrance to reasoning. Secondly, the syllogisms present a situation in which a generalization is verbally made and a specific conclusion is sought whereas the ESS Creature Card task involves the presentation of a phenomenon from which the subject must firstly generalize. Thirdly, the modality of presentation is different for both, with the syllogisms being presented verbally by an adult interviewer while the ESS Creature Card is presented in booklet form in a more relaxed, self-paced situation as described in more detail below.
Results
Presentation of the results focuses on the three main sets of variables: deductive syllogistic reasoning, inductive reasoning on the creature card task and information processing synthesis styles based on the Luria model, and the correlations between these variables.
Syllogistic reasoning
A clear feature that emerged from this study is the difference in responses to the two types of syllogisms (Table 1) . Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 list the percentage of subjects who were able to logically reason on the number of items given in column 1. For example, with the fantasy-based syllogisms, almost 60 percent of children were able to justify successfully their reasoning on logical grounds for all five syllogisms with only nine percent being unable to reason logically on any of the examples. In contrast, 36 percent of children were able to justify their responses on all five of the real-life syllogisms but 42 per cent were unable to respond correctly to any of these examples. There was no significant effect attributed to the order of presentation of the syllogisms. The children performed significantly better on the fantasy syllogisms (M = 3.88, SD = 1.7) than on the real-life syllogisms (M = 2.42, SD = 2.3), t(111) = 7.16, p < .001. Girls (M = 4.32, SD = 1.33) were more successful on the fantasy based syllogisms than boys (M = 3.49, SD = 1.93), F(1, 110) = 6.85, p = .01 but no significant gender difference was observed for the real-life syllogisms.
Inductive reasoning
The maximum score possible on the Creature Card task was 45. The mean score for the 137 subjects who completed this task was 30.45 (SD = 13.08) (Cronbach α = .86). A mean score of 8.58 (SD = 3.73) out of 15 was found for the task of constructing their own creature (Creature Design Variable). The girls (M = 9.4, n = 67) scored significantly better on this task than the boys (M = 7.8, n = 70), F(1,135) = 6.2, p < .02). The performance of the whole group on the Creature Cards test and Creature Design Variable was significantly correlated (r = 0.80 N = 137, p < .001) .
Luria model
The scores on the six tests (letter span, number span, word span, matrix A, matrix B and Raven's CPM) were subjected to a principal axis common factor analysis. The resulting factor solution was subjected to a varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization and standardized factor scores calculated for each subject using the SPSSPC statistical package.
The varimax rotated factor analysis of the six tests is shown in Table 2 The number span test is the test most dependent on successive processing and the matrix B test is a good measure of simultaneous processing. These results are consistent with those found by Angus (1984) .
Relationships between Luria variables and reasoning abilities
The data reveal significant correlations between the Luria variables of simultaneous and successive synthesis and the measures of deductive and inductive reasoning. The Pearson correlations for these variables are given in Table 3 
Discussion of Results
In this study the most striking observation is the difference in the ability of subjects to solve syllogisms presented in a fantasy or make-believe context and those presented in a real-life situation involving counterfactual premises. For example, children were more successful on the first type of syllogism below than on the second.
(i)
All bongos play basketball, animals that play basketball are slow, Wally is a Bongo, Is Wally slow?
(ii) All dogs drink milk, Animals that drink milk meow, Do dogs meow?
Both these syllogisms contain premises that are contrary to the experience and expectations that one would assume these children hold. However, it would appear that children are prepared to believe that fantasy creatures can possess attributes which are inconsistent with experience more so than real-life creatures or situations. If the first step in solving syllogisms is the formation of a mental representation of the premises, possibly involving imagery, the absence of a representation for a Bongo or Wobble facilitates the construction of a schema that accurately reflects the content of the premises. In contrast, the subject already possesses a stable schema for a man or dog which does not include information that dogs drink milk.
Clearly, real-life knowledge influences the strength or extent of the inferential rules that are required to combine the symbolic representations of the premises. If low in successive synthesis, the subject cannot sequentially retrieve the necessary rules and is required to develop relationships by an analysis of the current situation. Thus, real-life knowledge does not interfere with the combination process involving the symbolic representations in working memory.
We now turn to a discussion of the inductive reasoning task. The solution to this task would require the subject to scan the prototypical creatures, to generate a representation of an exemplary member of the class and then to scan the non-members seeking attributes which would eliminate particular cases from class membership. Because these are fantasy creatures, the subject has no knowledge base to activate and draw upon and so is dependent entirely on the perceptual cues and a novel solution strategy. The strong correlation between the identification of the features of a class member and the ability to apply this representation by creating and drawing their own creature with all the necessary attributes reinforces the contention that the subjects generated a spatial image or schemata which is holistically structured. The correlation between success at the Creature Card Task and the Luria Simultaneous synthesis factor implies a neuropsychological mechanism for the generation of this schemata.
In this study, anecdotal information shared by teachers and parents of the subjects confirmed one striking feature. Those children who were relatively balanced in their levels of simultaneous and successive processing were seen to be well-adjusted, high achieving students, often with a strong interest and ability in mathematics and science. These children, it would appear, are able to facilitate problem solving through application of both modes of information processing. Of particular interest, were the reports on children who were imbalanced in their levels of simultaneous and successive processing especially those cases where the simultaneous was high and the successive low. This category of child was frequently described as an underachiever who often displayed extraordinary insight or persistence with problems of a scientific nature. There are implications here both for an understanding of the relevance of the Luria model and for the significance of inductive and deductive problem solving tasks of the type used in this work.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to document individual differences in children's performance on reasoning tasks associated with scientific reasoning. Individual differences in cognition were defined in terms of the Luria model of simultaneous and successive information processing. The findings suggest that those children with higher levels of simultaneous processing are more successful in both deductive and inductive reasoning and hence in general scientific reasoning. However, the results do not exclude a strategy or mode of problem solving in which successive synthesis is applied.
As Lawson et al. (1991) have argued, learning in science depends on an efficient level of reasoning in the learner rather than the possession of an extensive declarative knowledge. Children's knowledge of scientific concepts develops through observation of every day phenomena which they presumably encode as simple mental representations. The declarative knowledge base of young children is thus very much at the perceptual level. However, Clement (1994) argues that even scientists who are reasoning in an unfamiliar domain reason "directly or by analogy from examples for which the subject could generate a clear imagistic solution" and similarly, novices in the area of physics construct "qualitative representations of problems before attempting any quantitative analysis" (White & Frederiksen, 1986) . Representation of more abstract concepts as the learner's level of expertise increases may involve a greater demand for combination of representations and access to rules or heuristics. Ultimately, effective understanding involves the establishment of a schematized abstraction of experiences involving a rich network of connections between concepts and incorporating access to problem solving strategies. This is identified in mathematics education as relational understanding. If one applies the arguments of Battista (1994) based on research in mathematics education to science education, relational understanding of science concepts involves the facility to mentally manipulate and perform operations with mental models. The psychometric model stemming from the research of Luria provides a framework for exploring these processes in individual children.
In addition, the Luria model implies the need for certain instructional strategies. If learners construct meaning through the generation of mental representations facilitated by a simultaneous mode of information processing then information needs to be presented in a way that is harmonious with this process. For children, the implication is that novel experiences involving scientific phenomena need to be presented in a spatial form making use of analogy with potentially existing representations. Improvement in instruction should occur when teachers begin to focus on problem solving in learning environments that encourage individual exploration and construction of models. Instruction also needs to be tailored to meet the needs of exceptional children who may be more reliant on one or other of the mode of information processing discussed in this paper. Bechtol and Sorenson (1993) have argued that teachers should taken into account the learning styles of children. How this can be achieved is problematic. The existing research on learning styles (R Dunn & K Dunn, 1975; Guild & Garger, 1985; McCarthy, 1990; Witkin, Moore, Goodenough & Cox, 1977) is not convincingly grounded in any satisfactory theory of cognition. Bechtol and Sorenson (1993) add support here: many researchers have achieved amazing success with groups of underachieving and problem children using their own style models and methods, but usually fail to convince their peers of the merit of their programs. Some experts accept style as a learning variable only cautiously. Others label it a fad or frill. Maybe we don't know enough about styles and related brain research to have widespread agreement on how to use style -learning or teaching in the classroom. (pp. 204 -205) .
Holistic learning has been advocated in science to encourage engagement in and the construction of personal understanding of concepts for all children (Samples & Hammond, 1985) . However, to effectively implement of strategies the teacher needs to be aware of the relationship between the underlying cognitive characteristics of children and the demands of the learning science. 
